That ancient rhetorical trope, symbolic patricide, is alive and well in contemporary philosophy. One need look no further than the fate of Gilles Deleuze at the hands of those who amass beneath the plural banner of contemporary philosophy for proof of this. Of course the great, unavoidable irony is that the position of father is often only occupied post mortem, symbolic murder being at the same time the installation of this or that thinker at the head of yesterday's table. I mean here simply that in the rush to stake new theoretical ground beyond 'post-modernism', hermeneutics and deconstruction, wild empiricism, correlationism -in sum, all of those avatars of imperialism our autochthonous fairy tales warn us about in such dire tones -Deleuze's name comes to stand in for everything we must not anymore want or think, despite his demonstrable innocence in many regards. This prosecutory fervor leads to critical attacks that engage very little with the work itself, unconsciously exemplifying Walter Benjamin's ninth thesis for the critic: 'Polemics mean to destroy a book in a few of its sentences. The less it has been studied the better ' (2008: 67) .
One striking and important exception is Ray Brassier's critical reconstruction of Deleuze's Difference and Repetition in his Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction .
1 In just under 25 compact pages, Brassier explicates the entire system of Difference and Repetition , with great novelty and insight. He follows this with a critique that is grounded in this excavatory work, and which gains a great deal of its force from this. Nonetheless, Brassier's critique turns around a fatal conflation. At issue is the status of thought for Deleuze. Brassier argues that Difference and Repetition gives an occulted primacy to human thought, such that it itself is conceived as the raison d'être of the individuation of all beings and in general. Deleuze's project, despite its apparent embrace of a 'powerful non-organic life', (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 81) in the end privileges not just the organic over the inorganic, but the human over the nonhuman. Turn the vitalist geo-philosopher's cloak inside out and one finds a patchwork Humean empiricism and a kind of neo-humanism that is unjustifiable by its own lights, however novel the terms of its deployment. His ontology having adopted 'a privileged role for a special kind of being, an exceptional mode of individuation, that of the psyche' (Brassier 2007: 163) , Deleuze ends up having to illicitly assert 'the exclusive prerogative of homo sapiens (Brassier 2007: 201) .
What follows falls into the category of 'interpretation and defence', to borrow a subtitle from Henry Allison's well-known text on the first Critique (Allison 2004). The problem that Brassier raises is a decisive one, and it is by following Brassier's argument through that an alternative way to construe Deleuze's position emerges, one that does not lead to the ruinous conclusion that, for Deleuze, human thought must have an essential, if occulted, primacy. I mean by this that despite the apparently technical nature of the argument I wish to present, it involves a very basic question about the place of the human in Deleuze's work. Brassier's reading, though mistaken, casts an important light on this question.
In what follows, I will argue that the project of Difference and Repetition can be construed in such a way as to preserve at once the qualitative difference of human being from that of the nonhuman, and the unity of the means of production of all three regimes.
2 This twin requirement, it would seem, is not only necessary in order for Deleuze's account to be at all acceptable (the human in fact being qualitatively different from the various registers of the nonhuman), it also repeats in another register the elementary ontological commitment of Difference and Repetition -to the expression of ineliminable difference on the basis of an absolute univocity of being.
Subjectal and objectal
I would begin here by hazarding a distinction in order to clarify what is at stake. This is above all due to the fact that the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' are used by Deleuze to qualify two different modalities of doxa , rather than marking an ontological distinction between the subject and the object (Deleuze 1994: 129-30) . It also helps to avoid the word 'subjectivity', which is only used once in Difference and Repetition in a very specific fashion (Deleuze 1994: 71) .
I will term subjectal the system composed by human thought, that is, the actual and achieved (that is, individuated) noological capacities of
